Simple Proof of Security of the BB84 Quantum Key Distribution Protocol by Shor, Peter W. & Preskill, John
VOLUME 85, NUMBER 2 P H Y S I C A L R E V I E W L E T T E R S 10 JULY 2000Simple Proof of Security of the BB84 Quantum Key Distribution Protocol
Peter W. Shor1 and John Preskill2
1AT&T Labs Research, Florham Park, New Jersey 07932
2Lauritsen Laboratory of High Energy Physics, California Institute of Technology, Pasadena, California 91125
(Received 28 February 2000)
We prove that the 1984 protocol of Bennett and Brassard (BB84) for quantum key distribution is
secure. We first give a key distribution protocol based on entanglement purification, which can be
proven secure using methods from Lo and Chau’s proof of security for a similar protocol. We then show
that the security of this protocol implies the security of BB84. The entanglement purification based
protocol uses Calderbank-Shor-Steane codes, and properties of these codes are used to remove the use
of quantum computation from the Lo-Chau protocol.
PACS numbers: 03.67.DdQuantum cryptography differs from conventional cryp-
tography in that the data are kept secret by the properties of
quantum mechanics, rather than the conjectured difficulty
of computing certain functions. The first quantum key dis-
tribution protocol, proposed in 1984 [1], is called BB84
after its inventors (Bennett and Brassard). In this protocol,
the participants (Alice and Bob) wish to agree on a secret
key about which no eavesdropper (Eve) can obtain signifi-
cant information. Alice sends each bit of the secret key in
one of a set of conjugate bases which Eve does not know,
and this key is protected by the impossibility of measur-
ing the state of a quantum system simultaneously in two
conjugate bases. The original papers proposing quantum
key distribution [1] proved it secure against certain attacks,
including those feasible using current experimental tech-
niques. However, for many years, it was not rigorously
proven secure against an adversary able to perform any
physical operation permitted by quantum mechanics.
Recently, three proofs of the security of quantum key
distribution protocols have been discovered; however, none
is entirely satisfactory. One proof [2], although easy to
understand, has the drawback that the protocol requires a
quantum computer. The other two [3,4] prove the security
of a protocol based on BB84, and so are applicable to near-
practical settings. However, both proofs are quite compli-
cated. We give a simpler proof by relating the security of
BB84 to entanglement purification protocols [5] and quan-
tum error correcting codes [6]. This new proof also may
illuminate some properties of previous proofs [3,4], and
thus gives insight into them. For example, it elucidates
why the rates obtainable from these proofs are related to
rates for Calderbank-Shor-Steane (CSS) codes. The proof
was in fact inspired by the observation that CSS codes are
hidden in the inner workings of the proof given in [3].
We first review CSS codes and associated entanglement
purification protocols. Quantum error correcting codes are
subspaces of the Hilbert space 2n which are protected
from errors in a small number of these qubits, so that any
such error can be measured and subsequently corrected
without disturbing the encoded state. A quantum CSS code0031-90070085(2)441(4)$15.00 ©Q on n qubits comes from two binary codes on n bits, C1
and C2, one contained in the other:
0 , C2 , C1 , Fn2 ,
where Fn2 is the binary vector space on n bits [6].
A set of basis states (which we call code words) for the
CSS code subspace can be obtained from vectors y [ C1
as follows:
y ! 1jC2j12
X
w[C2
jy 1 w . (1)
If y1 2 y2 [ C2, then the code words corresponding to
y1 and y2 are the same. Hence these code words cor-
respond to cosets of C2 in C1, and this code protects a
Hilbert space of dimension 2dimC12dimC2 .
The above quantum code is equivalent to the dual code
Q obtained from the two binary codes
0 , C1 , C

2 , F
n
2 .
This equivalence can be demonstrated by applying the
Hadamard transform
H 
1p
2
µ
1 1
1 21
∂
to each encoding qubit. This transformation interchanges
the bases j0, j1 and j1, j2, where j1  1p
2
j0 1
j1 and j2  1p
2
j0 2 j1. It also interchanges the two
subspaces corresponding to the codes Q and Q, although
the code words [given by Eq. (1)] of Q and Q are not
likewise interchanged.
We now make a brief technical detour to define some
terms. The three Pauli matrices are
sx 
µ
0 1
1 0
∂
, sy 
µ
0 2i
i 0
∂
,
sz 
µ
1 0
0 21
∂
.
The matrix sx applies a bit flip error to a qubit, while
sz applies a phase flip error. We denote the Pauli matrix
sa acting on the kth bit of the CSS code by sak for2000 The American Physical Society 441
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ssa  s
s1
a1 ≠ ss2a2 ≠ ss3a3 ≠ · · · ≠ ssnan ,
where s0a is the identity matrix and si is the ith bit of s.
The matrices ssx (ssz ) have all eigenvalues 61.
In a classical error correcting code, correction proceeds
by measuring the syndrome, which is done as follows. A
parity check matrix H of a code C is a basis of the dual
vector space C. Suppose that we transmit a code word y,
which acquires errors to become w  y 1 e. The kth row
rk of the matrix H determines the kth bit of the syndrome
for w, namely, rk ? w mod2. The full syndrome is thus
Hw. If the syndrome is 0, then w [ C. Otherwise, the
most likely value of the error e can be calculated from
the syndrome [7]. In our quantum CSS code, we need
to correct both bit and phase errors. Let H1 be a parity
check matrix for the code C1, and H2 one for the code C2 .
To calculate the syndrome for bit flips, we measure the
eigenvalue of srz for each row r [ H1 (21’s and 1’s of
the eigenvalue correspond to 1’s and 0’s of the syndrome).
To calculate the syndrome for phase flips, we measure
the eigenvalue of srx for each row r [ H2. This lets us
correct both bit and phase flips, and if we can correct up
to t of each of these types of errors, we can also correct
arbitrary errors on up to t qubits [6].
The useful property of CSS codes for demonstrating the
security of BB84 is that the error correction for the phases
is decoupled from that for the bit values, as shown above.
General quantum stabilizer codes can similarly be turned
into key distribution protocols, but these appear to require
a quantum computer to implement.
If one requires that a CSS code corrects all errors
on at most t  dn qubits, the best codes that we know
exist satisfy the quantum Gilbert-Varshamov bound. As
the block length n goes to infinity, these codes asymp-
totically protect against dn bit errors and dn phase
errors, and encode 1 2 2H2dn qubits, where H
is the binary Shannon entropy Hp  2p log2p 2
1 2 p log21 2 p. In practice, it is better to require
only that random errors are corrected with high proba-
bility. In this case, codes exist that correct dn random
phase errors and dn random bit errors, and which encode
1 2 2Hdn qubits.
We also need a description of the Bell basis. These are
the four maximally entangled states:
C6 
1p
2
j01 6 j10, F6  1p
2
j00 6 j11 ,
which form an orthogonal basis for the quantum state space
of two qubits.
Finally, we introduce a class of quantum error correct-
ing codes equivalent to Q, and parametrized by two n-bit
binary vectors x and z. Suppose that Q is determined as
above by C1 and C2. Then Qx,z has basis vectors indexed
by cosets of C2 in C1, and for y [ C1, the corresponding442code word is
y ! 1jC2j12
X
w[C2
21z?wjx 1 y 1 w . (2)
Quantum error correcting codes and entanglement
purification protocols are closely connected [5]; we now
describe the entanglement purification protocol corre-
sponding to the CSS code Q. For now, we assume that
the codes C1 and C2 correct up to t errors and that Q
encodes m qubits in n qubits. Suppose Alice and Bob
share n pairs of qubits in a state close to F1≠n. For
the entanglement purification protocol, Alice and Bob
separately measure the eigenvalues of srz for each row
r [ H1 and sr
0
x for each row r 0 [ H2. Note that for
these measurements to be performable simultaneously,
they must all commute; srz and sr
0
x commute because
the vector spaces C1 and C2 are orthogonal.
If Alice and Bob start with n perfect EPR pairs, measur-
ing srz for r [ H1 and sr
0
x for r 0 [ H2 projects each
of their states onto the code subspace Qx,z , where x and z
are any binary vectors with H1x and H2z equal to the mea-
sured bit and phase syndromes, respectively. After projec-
tion, the state is F1≠m encoded by Qx,z .
Now, suppose that Alice and Bob start with a state close
to F1≠n. To be specific, suppose that all their EPR pairs
are in the Bell basis, with t or fewer bit flips (C1 or C2
pairs) and t or fewer phase flips (F2 or C2 pairs). If
Alice and Bob compare their measurements of srz (srx ),
the rows r for which these measurements disagree give the
bits which are 1 in the bit (phase) syndromes. From these
syndromes, Alice and Bob can compute the locations of
the bit and the phase flips, can correct these errors, and
can then decode Qx,z to obtain m perfect EPR pairs.
We will show that the following is a secure quantum key
distribution protocol.
Protocol 1: Modified Lo-Chau.—(1) Alice creates 2n
EPR pairs in the state F1≠2n. (2) Alice selects a ran-
dom 2n-bit string b, and performs a Hadamard transform
on the second half of each EPR pair for which b is 1.
(3) Alice sends the second half of each EPR pair to Bob.
(4) Bob receives the qubits and publicly announces this
fact. (5) Alice selects n of the 2n encoded EPR pairs to
serve as check bits to test for Eve’s interference. (6) Alice
announces the bit string b, and which n EPR pairs are to
be check bits. (7) Bob performs Hadamards on the qubits
where b is 1. (8) Alice and Bob each measure their halves
of the n check EPR pairs in the j0, j1 basis and share the
results. If too many of these measurements disagree, they
abort the protocol. (9) Alice and Bob make the measure-
ments on their code qubits of srz for each row r [ H1
and srx for each row r [ H2. Alice and Bob share the
results, compute the syndromes for bit and phase flips, and
then transform their state so as to obtain m nearly perfect
EPR pairs. (10) Alice and Bob measure the EPR pairs in
the j0, j1 basis to obtain a shared secret key.
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show that the probability is exponentially small that Alice
and Bob agree on a key about which Eve can obtain more
than an exponentially small amount of information. We
need a result of Lo and Chau [2] that if Alice and Bob share
a state having fidelity 1 2 22s with F1≠m, then Eve’s
mutual information with the key is at most 22c 1 2O22s
where c  s 2 log22m 1 s 1 1 loge2.
For the proof, we use an argument based on one from
Lo and Chau [2]. Let us calculate the probability that the
test on the check bits succeeds while the entanglement pu-
rification on the code bits fails. We do this by considering
the measurement that projects each of the EPR pairs onto
the Bell basis.
We first consider the check bits. Note that for the EPR
pairs where b  1, Alice and Bob are effectively measur-
ing them in the j1, j2 basis rather than the j0, j1 basis.
Now, observe that
jC1 	C1j 1 jC2 	C2j  j01 	01j 1 j10 	10j ,
jF2 	F2j 1 jC2 	C2j  j12 	12j 1 j21 	21j .
These relations show that the rates of bit flip errors and
of phase flip errors that Alice and Bob estimate from their
measurements on check bits are the same as they would
have estimated using the Bell basis measurement.
We next consider the measurements on the code bits.
We want to show that the purification protocol applied to n
pairs produces a state that is close to the encoded F1≠m.
The purification protocol succeeds perfectly acting on the
space spanned by Bell pairs that differ from F1≠n by t
or fewer bit flip errors and by t or fewer phase flips errors.
Let P denote the projection onto this space. Then if the
protocol is applied to an initial density operator r of the
n pairs, it can be shown that the final density operator r0
approximates F1≠m with fidelity
F 
 	F1≠mjr0j F1≠m $ trPr . (3)
Hence the fidelity is at least as large as the probability that
t or fewer bit flip errors and t or fewer phase flip errors
would have been found, if the Bell measurement had been
performed on all n pairs.
Now, when Eve has access to the qubits, she does not
yet know which qubits are check qubits and which are
code qubits, so she cannot treat them differently. The
check qubits that Alice and Bob measure thus behave like
a classical random sample of the qubits. We are then able
to use the measured error rates in a classical probability
estimate; we find that probability of obtaining more than
dn bit (phase) errors on the code bits and fewer than d 2en errors on the check bits is asymptotically less than
exp2 14e2nd 2 d2. We conclude that if Alice and
Bob have greater than an exponentially small probability
of passing the test, then the fidelity of Alice and Bob’s
state with F1≠m is exponentially close to 1.
We now show how to turn this Lo-Chau– type protocol
into a quantum error correcting code protocol. Observe
first that it does not matter whether Alice measures her
check bits before or after she transmits half of each EPR
pair to Bob, and similarly that it does not matter whether
she measures the syndrome before or after this transmis-
sion. If she measures the check bits first, this is the same as
choosing a random one of j0, j1. If she also measures the
syndrome first, this is equivalent to transmitting m halves
of EPR pairs encoded by the CSS code Qx,z for two ran-
dom vectors x, z [ Fn2 . The vector x is determined by the
syndrome measurements srz for rows r [ H1, and simi-
larly for z. Alice can also measure her half of the encoded
EPR pairs before or after transmission. If she measures
them first, this is the same as choosing a random key k
and encoding k using Qx,z . We thus obtain the following
equivalent protocol.
Protocol 2: CSS Codes.—(1) Alice creates n random
check bits, a random m-bit key k, and a random 2n-bit
string b. (2) Alice chooses n-bit strings x and z at random.
(3) Alice encodes her key jk using the CSS code Qx,z .
(4) Alice chooses n positions (out of 2n) and puts the check
bits in these positions and the code bits in the remaining
positions. (5) Alice applies a Hadamard transform to those
qubits in the positions having 1 in b. (6) Alice sends
the resulting state to Bob. Bob acknowledges receipt of
the qubits. (7) Alice announces b, the positions of the
check bits, the values of the check bits, and the x and z
determining the code Qx,z . (8) Bob performs Hadamards
on the qubits where b is 1. (9) Bob checks whether too
many of the check bits have been corrupted, and aborts
the protocol if so. (10) Bob decodes the key bits and uses
them for the key.
Intuitively, the security of the protocol depends on the
fact that for a sufficiently low error rate, a CSS code trans-
mits the information encoded by it with very high fidelity,
so that by the no-cloning principle very little information
can leak to Eve.
We now give the final argument that turns the above
protocol into BB84. First note that, since all Bob cares
about are the bit values of the encoded key, and the string
z is only used to correct the phase of the encoded qubits,
Bob does not need z. This is why we use CSS codes: they
decouple the phase correction from the bit correction. Let
k0 [ C1 be a binary vector that is mapped by Eq. (2) to
the encoded key. Since Bob never uses z, we can assume
that Alice does not send it. Averaging over z, we see that
Alice effectively sends the mixed state1
2njC2j
X
z
" X
w1,w2[C2
21w11w2?zjk0 1 w1 1 x 	k0 1 w2 1 xj
#

1
jC2j
X
w[C2
jk0 1 w 1 x 	k0 1 w 1 xj , (4)443
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with w chosen randomly in C2. Let us now look at the
protocol as a whole. The error correction information
Alice gives Bob is x, and Alice sends jk0 1 x 1 w over
the quantum channel. Over many iterations of the algo-
rithm, these are random variables chosen uniformly in Fn2
with the constraint that their difference k0 1 w is in C1.
After Bob receives k0 1 w 1 x 1 e, he subtracts x, and
corrects the result to a code word in C1, which is almost
certain to be k0 1 w. The key is the coset of k0 1 w
over C2.
In the BB84 protocol given below, Alice sends jy to
Bob, with error correction information u 1 y. These are
again two random variables uniform in Fn2 , with the con-
straint that u [ C1. Bob obtains y 1 e, subtracts u 1 y,
and corrects the result to a code word in C1, which with
high probability is u. The key is then the coset u 1 C2.
Thus, the two protocols are completely equivalent.
Protocol 3: BB84.—(1) Alice creates 4 1 dn random
bits. (2) Alice chooses a random 4 1 dn-bit string b.
For each bit, she creates a state in the j0, j1 basis (if
the corresponding bit of b is 0) or the j1, j2 basis (if
the bit of b is 1). (3) Alice sends the resulting qubits
to Bob. (4) Bob receives the 4 1 dn qubits, measuring
each in the j0,j1 or the j1,j2 basis at random. (5) Alice
announces b. (6) Bob discards any results where he mea-
sured a different basis than Alice prepared. With high
probability, there are at least 2n bits left (if not, they abort
the protocol). Alice decides randomly on a set of 2n bits
to use for the protocol, and chooses at random n of these
to be check bits. (7) Alice and Bob announce the values of
their check bits. If too few of these values agree, they abort
the protocol. (8) Alice announces u 1 y, where y is the
string consisting of the remaining noncheck bits, and u is
a random code word in C1. (9) Bob subtracts u 1 y from
his code qubits, y 1 e, and corrects the result, u 1 e, to
a code word in C1. (10) Alice and Bob use the coset of
u 1 C2 as the key.
There are a few loose ends that need to be tied up. The
protocol given above uses binary codes C1 and C2 with
large minimum distance, and thus can obtain rates given
by the quantum Gilbert-Varshamov bound for CSS codes
[6]. To reach the better Shannon bound for CSS codes,
we need to use codes for which a random small set of
phase errors and bit errors can almost always be corrected.
To prove that the protocol works in this case, we need to
ensure that the errors are indeed random. We do this by
adding a step where Alice scrambles the qubits using a
random permutation p before sending them to Bob, and
a step after Bob acknowledges receiving the qubits where
Alice sends p to Bob and he unscrambles the qubits. This
can work as long as the measured bit and phase error rates444are less than 11%, the point at which the Shannon rate
1 2 2Hd hits 0.
For a practical key distribution protocol we need the
classical code C1 to be efficiently decodeable. As is shown
in [3], we can let C2 be a random subcode of an efficiently
decodeable code C1, and with high probability obtain a
good code C2 . While known efficiently decodeable codes
do not meet the Shannon bound, they come fairly close.
A weakness in both the proof given in this paper and
the proofs in [3,4] is that they do not apply if Alice some-
times inadvertently sends two or more identical copies of
her qubit instead of just one copy. A proof avoiding this
difficulty was recently discovered by Ben-Or [8]; it shows
that any source sufficiently close to a single-photon source
is still secure. However, most experimental quantum key
distribution systems use weak coherent sources, and no
currently known proof covers this case.
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